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DEFENSES TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES
Dario A. Garibaldi*
INTRODUCTION
T HE DOCTRINE of strict liability in tort has arisen to meet the needs
of present day economic, social and moral conditions. The doctrine is
the natural outgrowth of Justice Cardozo's perceptive and justifiably ac-
claimed opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,' in which the privity
requirement was abrogated in ordinary tort liability in inherently or
imminently dangerous situations. Among the first appearances of strict
liability in tort in more recent times are the cases of Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.' and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.3
Society's need for the theory of strict liability is evidenced by the ex-
tremely rapid rate of growth it has experienced in the relatively short
period of time it has been applied. The number of pertinent cases
prevents any comprehensive discussion in this article. My purpose
herein is the very practical one of outlining what I believe to be the
most important and most frequently employed defenses to this type of
action. This is not a theoretical or philosophical dissertation. It is
written in the hope that it may be of some value to both plantiff's and
defendant's bar in the trial of strict liability in tort causes.
* Dario Anthony Garibaldi, born Chicago, Illinois, 1932; admitted to bar, 1960, Illinois;
also admitted to practice before U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, U.S. Court of
Claims. Preparatory education, Wabash College (B.A., 1954-summa cum laude-Phi Beta
Kappa, 1953) ; legal education, Univ. of Chicago Law School (J.D., 1957). Member: Chicago
Bar Association (Member, Committee on Civil Practice, 1965 to -), Illinois Trial Law-
yers Assoc. (Editor "Trial Talk" 1970 to -), American Trial Lawyers Assoc. and Illinois
State Bar Assoc.; Justinian Society of Lawyers; Co-editor ISBA "Torts Trends" 1967 to
1970; Author of A New Look at Hospitals' Liability For Hepatitis Contaminated Blood On
Principles 0/ Strict Tort Liability, 48 Chi. Bar Rec. 204 (1967).
1 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
a 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
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1. In General
Generally, in a case involving strict liability in tort, the principle
elements which the plaintiff must prove are: (1) the defective and
unreasonably dangerous condition of the defendant's product, (2) that
the product was unreasonably dangerous through its defect when it left
the defendant's control, (3) that the defendant is engaged in a regular
business or field of enterprise as the result of which the product has
gone into the stream of commerce, (4) some authorities indicate that a
showing must be made that the product is expected to and does reach
the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition and
that it would be used without inspection for defects.4
Although strict tort liability and warranty liability have been
somewhat confused by the opinions and are somewhat interrelated,
nevertheless, there are some defenses applicable to warranty liability
which are not defenses in strict tort liability.' These distinctions will be
discussed more fully later in this article. The application of traditional
negligence, contract and warranty defenses such as lack of privity, lack
of reliance on a warranty, lack of notice to the defendant of breach of
warranty, disclaimer of implied warranties, etc., are not applicable.
2. Some States Have Not Adopted the Theory
Probably the best defense to strict liability in tort cases is the most
obvious one, where applicable, and that is that the particular jurisdic-
tion whose law is applicable may not have adopted the doctrine. Inas-
much as the law is constantly changing, it will be necessary for each
defendant to examine the law of his state to determine whether or not
it has adopted the theory. To date, the following states are applying the
theory: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin.
The federal courts in Vermont, Indiana and Colorado, guessing at
state law, have concluded that the rule would be accepted. All states,
with the possible exceptions of Idaho and Louisiana, have adopted
4 Id.; see R. Hursh, American Law of Products Liability 226, 227 (Supp. 1970); L.
Frumer and M. Friedman, Products Liability (1960).
5 Hursh, supra n.4 at 227-28.
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various statutes including the Uniform Commercial Code, which par-
tially abrogate the privity requirement. There appear to be ten states
which have rendered decisions rejecting strict liability without privity.
These states are: Delaware, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Dakota and West
Virginia. However, with the exception of Idaho, these decisions have
been partially overcome by statutes.6
3. Privity of Contract
Contract and sales considerations are not controlling under the rule
of strict liability in tort. Privity of contract is not a defense. On occasion,
similar rulings have been achieved in warranty cases by abrogation of
the requirement of privity of contract. This appears to be considered
in the Uniform Commercial Code as well.7 Also Restatement of Torts
2d, Section 402A provides that the doctrine is applicable even though
there is no contractual relationship with the defendant.
4. Necessity for Sale
Although in warranty cases there is usually a necessity for a sale,
there have been cases imposing liability in warranty without a sale, for
instance in bailment cases.8
However, in strict liability cases a sale is not necessary to impose
liability. In Delaney v. Towmotor Corp.,9 a manufacturer had allowed
a stevedoring company to use a forklift truck merely to become ac-
quainted with it. The employee was injured and liability was imposed.
In Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing,"° the defendant was a bailor and
was not a manufacturer. This case appears to be based upon an ex-
tension of implied warranty. Liability has also been held in favor of
the user of a laundromat." A beauty parlor operator has been held
liable for injuries from a cold wave permanent and the lessor has been
held liable for a defective ladder.' 2
Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d describes actions
against a seller who is engaged in the business of selling products and
O See W. Schwartz, A Products Liability Primer, 33 A.T.LJ. 64, 69 (1970).
7 See U.C.C. § 2-318; 2 L. Frumer and M. Friedman, supra n.4 at § 16A [51 [d].
8 2 L. Frumer and M. Friedman, supra n.4 at § 16A [51 [c].
o 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964).
10 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
11 Thompson v. Reily, 211 So.2d 537 (Miss. 1968).
12 Supra n.6 at 85.
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further specifies that the doctrine applies to manufacturers, wholesale
or retail dealers or distributors and operators of restaurants. The com-
ment goes on to state that the doctrine does not apply to the occasional
seller who is not engaged in selling as a part of his business nor to the
sales of the stock of merchandise out of the usual course of business such
as execution sales, bankruptcy sales, bulk sales, etc. There are other
situations in which the doctrine has been applied. For instance, a savings
and loan association which financed a housing tract was held subject to
liability to purchasers of houses in the tract for loss from gross structural
hazards, where the existence of such hazards indicate the financing
agency's failure to ascertain soil conditions and to take other precau-
tions. 3 A tract home developer was held liable on this theory for defective
hot water system installed in a home.' 4 Lessor of a chattel was held liable
in McClaflin v. Bayshore Equipment Rental Co.'5
5. Notice and Reliance
There are warranty cases holding that the notice requirement is
not applicable where the plaintiff sustains personal injuries and where
the action is not between a buyer and seller, although notice of breach
of warranty is generally required under both the Uniform Commercial
Code and Uniform Sales Act. Because notice is a contractual considera-
tion in warranty cases, it is not required under theories of strict liability
in tort. Also, reliance is not required under the strict liability theory.
Again, in distinguishing warranty cases from strict liability cases, it
should be remembered that reliance is required under both the Uniform
Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code, although neither statute
requires reliance when the warranty action is based on warranty of
merchantability."
6. Disclaimers
Disclaimers, being matters of contract, are not controlling under
the rule of strict liability in tort.' 7 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.,'" invalidating the then standard disclaimer of the automobile in-
13 Connor v. Coneho Valley Development Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1967); see Hursh, supra
n.4 at 270.
14 Shipper v. Levitt and Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
15 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969).
16 2 L. Frumer and M. Friedman, supra n.4 at § 16A [5] [d].
17 See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 19 (1964) and Haley v.
Merit Chevrolet. Inc.. 67 Ill. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966).
18 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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dustry, seems to have left open the contention as to "surprise results"
as a basis to invalidate disclaimers. In Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt,"9 express
waivers of implied warranties were deemed "unconscionable" under the
Uniform Commercial Code.
7. Defective and Unreasonably Dangerous Condition of the Product
This subject encompasses a great deal of material. Obviously, in
order to recover, the plaintiff must plead and prove that the product was
defective and unreasonably dangerous when it left the hands or control
of the defendant. Generally, defendants urge that the product was not
defective and was not unreasonably dangerous, if it was indeed defec-
tive.
a. In General
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.2 held that defendant was
strictly liable in tort where the product which it had placed on the mar-
ket, knowing it was to be used without inspection for defects, proved
to have a defect that caused injury to the plaintiff, who had used the
product "in a way it was intended to be used" and that the product was
"unsafe for its intended use."
b. What Constitutes Defective Condition
The term "defect" has been defined only on a case to case basis
and so far has not been susceptible to any general definition.2 Chief
Justice Traynor has stated that "no single definition of defect has
proved adequate to define the scope of the manufacturer's strict liability
in tort for physical injuries."22 Where the material used in manufacture
is such that the material may not be safely used for the purpose in-
tended, a defect exists.2" In Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian Inc.,' it
was suggested that a product is defective if it is not reasonably fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such products are sold and used. When
it is shown that a product failed to meet reasonable expectations of the
user, the inference is that there was some sort of a defect, a precise
19 230 S.W.2d 778 (Ark. 1968).
20 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
21 Hursh, supra n.4 at 235.
22 R. Traynor, The Ways and Means of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
Tenn. L. Rev. 363, 373 (1965).
23 See, e.g., Fanning v. LeMay, 78 Ill. App. 2d 166, 222 N.E.2d 815 (1966) and Dunham
v. Vaughan and Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684 (1967).
24 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
definition of which is unnecessary. If the product failed under condi-
tions concerning which an average consumer of that product could have
fairly definite expectations, then the jury would have a basis for making
an informed judgment upon the existence of a defect. Heaton v. Ford
Motor Co.25 held that a jury can find a product defective when there is
evidence of one or more of the following: a dangerous defect in manu-
facturing; and unreasonably dangerous design; circumstances in which,
from common knowledge, the average user reasonably could have ex-
pected the product to perform safely. In Greenco v. Clark Equipment
Co.26 the court held that liability is conditioned upon the existence of a
defective condition at the time the product leaves the seller's control,
which condition is not contemplated by the consumer or user and is
unreasonably dangerous in the sense that it is more dangerous than
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer or user with the
ordinary knowledge of the community as to the product's characteristics
and uses. Heaton v. Ford Motor Co.27 has held that the plaintiff must
show that the product was dangerously defective, but not that it was
ultra hazardous or that it was placed on the market negligently.
c. Defects in Design
Manufacturers' strict liability in tort may be based upon a defect
in design as well as a defect in manufacture." The lack of proper safety
devices can constitute a defective design.29 However, shoes that became
slippery when wet were not, for that reason, defective so as to make the
manufacturer liable. 0 The lack of a remote control starting switch, the
lack of a protective housing covering starter knob, the lack of a pro-
tective covering over the moving blade and the location of the blade
close to the metal housing were held design defects in regard to a power
mower in Ilnicki v. Montgomery Ward Co."'
d. Failure to Warn as a Defective Condition
Pursuant to comment H of § 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d,
where defendant has reason to anticipate that a danger may result from
25 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967).
26 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
27 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967).
28 Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966).
29 Barkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968).
30 Fanning v. LeMay, 38 IMl. 2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1966).
31 371 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1967).
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a particular use of his product and he fails to give adequate warning,
the product sold without such warning is in a defective condition. How-
ever, where a state statute required that dynamite be tested by the
ultimate user before using it and the product was sold with the expec-
tation that it would be tested for defects or limitations before using,
the court held that the existence of a state safety order that the product
be tested might be evidence that it was reasonable for suppliers of dyna-
mite fuse in some instances not to warn regarding fuse timing, but that
this was not conclusiveY In Crane v. Sears Roebuck and Co.,33 plain-
tiff's action was based upon the theory of breach of warranty; however,
it was held that defendant was required to warn against latent dangerous
characteristics and that the law of strict liability would be applied. In
the case of Love v. Wolf,34 even though one of the defendants failed to
give adequate warning that the continued use of one of his drugs could
result in disease; and even though it was advisable to have a patient's
blood tested to determine the extent of such a danger; and that it was
desirable to prevent a patient from using the drug for a prolonged pe-
riod; the court still refused to apply strict liability. Also, where the per-
son claiming the right to the warning has knowledge of the general
danger involved in the use of the product, although not the specific dan-
ger that caused the injury, it has been held the failure to warn did not
impose liability.3"
e. Failure to Inspect
It is generally considered that an injured plaintiff has no duty to
inspect or ferret out defects in the product.3" The questions of con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk are discussed below.
f. Condition as Unreasonably Dangerous
Again, defendants tend to defend the cases wherein they cannot
deny a defect by alleging that the defect was not unreasonably danger-
ous. As stated above, cases have held that the product must be dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it with the ordinary knowledge common to the
32 Cinifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
83 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963).
34 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964).
35 Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 275 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
86 See notes to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) and Williams v. Brown
Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
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community. In resolving this problem the courts must balance the utility
of the risk against the magnitude of the risk and should consider the
following factors: (1) the usefulness and desirability of the product,
(2) the availability of other and safer products to meet the same need,
(3) the likelihood of a serious injury, (4) the obviousness of the danger,
(5) the status of the public's customary expectation of the danger, (6)
the practical possibility of avoiding injury by care in manufacture as
well as by giving instructions as to the use of the product. 7
Where a child's jacket caught fire, evidence supporting the finding
that the behavior and characteristics of the jacket were unusual sup-
ported liability.3" Determination of "unreasonably dangerous" involves
a balancing of the likelihood and gravity of harm against the burden
of precautions which would be effective to avoid the harm. 9 Failure
to place a guard on a power takeoff "brush cutter" was held to constitute
an unreasonably dangerous condition.4" Also the danger may be simply
to the plaintiff's property and not to his person.41
8. Alteration of the Product After It Has Left Defendant's Hands
Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d states that the doctrine
applies when the product is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
Justice Traynor in one case held that strict liability in tort should not
extend to injuries which cannot be traced to the product as it reached
the market.42
Comment G of 402A requires the plaintiff to prove that the defec-
tive condition existed at the time it left the defendant's hands. A manu-
facturer of motor boat equipment was held not liable for injuries to
a passenger who fell from a boat and was struck by a propeller, although
the probable cause of injury was deficiency in the tiller kit. The kit had
been modified, after sale, to accommodate a motor of greater horse-
power.43
37 See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.W.L.J. 5, 15, 17 (1965).
38 LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
39 Dunham v. Vaughan and Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684 (1967).
40 Richey v. Sumage, 273 F. Supp. 904 (D. Or. 1967).
41 See Santor v. A. and M. Karagheusian Inc., 44 N.J. 32, 207 A.2d 305 (1964).
42 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
43 0. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 6 Ariz. App. 122, 430 P.2d 701 (1967) ; vacated on other
grounds, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968).
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Recovery, on the theory of strict tort liability, against an x-ray
manufacturer was barred when it was shown that parts of the machine
were improperly installed after leaving control of defendant.4"
In Dunhamn v. Vaughan," a chip from a claw hammer injured the
plaintiff while the plaintiff was pounding in a clevis pin. The hammer
had a greater tendency to chip as time passed. The court held it was a
jury question as to whether or not the hammer was defective when it
left the defendant's control. And in an action against the bottler and
retailer of Coca-Cola, for injury to the plaintiff when a bottle broke as
she tried to open it, evidence was held sufficient to establish the bottle
was defective when it left the hands of the retailer but not when it left
the hands of the bottler.46
Comment P of § 402A of the Restatement of the Law of Torts 2d
indicates that there may be circumstances under which a manufacturer
will be held liable although the product is further processed or changed
after leaving the defendant's hands. The comment states in part: "The
question is essentially one of whether the responsibility for discovery
and prevention of the dangerous defect is shifted to the intermediate
party who is to make the changes," and goes on to state, "No doubt
there will be some situations, and some defects, as to which the respon-
sibility will be shifted, and others in which it will not." Comment
Q, indicates that, particularly where the product itself is merely
incorporated into something larger, strict liability will be found to carry
through to the ultimate user or consumer.
In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,4" the court emphasized that the
manufacturer could not delegate its duty to have its automobiles deliv-
ered to the ultimate purchaser free from dangerous defects and could
not escape liability on the ground that the defect may have been caused
by one of the authorized dealers.
In Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co.,4" a manufacturer was held strictly
liable even though the defect might have been caused by the dealer or
retailer who was not an agent or employee of the manufacturer and
even though no instruction on the law of agency was required or neces-
44 Tucson General Hospital v. Russell, 7 Ariz. App. 193, 437 P.2d 677 (1968).
45 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
46 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hobart, 423 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
47 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
48 230 Cal. App. 2d 987, 41 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1964).
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sary insofar as the rule of strict liability in tort was concerned. The
court further held that an instruction which told the jury that the manu-
facturer would not be liable for what the distributor did, or failed to do,
would do violence to the rule of strict liability and was prejudically
erroneous because it enabled the jurors to exonerate the manufacturer
for an injury caused by a defect in the blade, when the manufacturer
left the completion of its product to its authorized dealer.
In Sharp v. Chrysler Corp.,49 the court held that if the manufac-
turer or assembler surrenders possession and control of a product in
which change will occur, or in which change can be anticipated to occur
so as to cause a product failure, the existence of a defect at the vital
time is established. An assembler or manufacturer who places into the
channels of trade a product so fragile that anticipated use is likely to
create a dangerous condition has distributed a defective product.
9. Causation-Res Ipsa Loquitur
Of course, plaintiff has the burden to prove that his injuries re-
sulted directly and proximately from the defective condition of the
product. Accordingly, a proper defense would be that the injuries were
not caused by the defective condition of the product, if the product was
defective. Frequently the proof of the defective and unreasonably
dangerous condition is inseparable from proof of causation. The same
circumstantial or expert evidence may be required to establish both.
If the product has been totally destroyed or if it cannot be pro-
duced for expert analysis, the question arises-can res ipsa loquitur
be used to prove a defective condition? The cases appear to go both
ways. In Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc.,"° plaintiff pur-
chased and took delivery of an automobile on October 19, 1962, and
had trouble with the headlights constantly from that time on, during
which period defendant undertook to remedy the situation. In Decem-
ber of 1963, the lights failed to function and plaintiff was injured. The
court, in effect, adopted the theory of res ipsa loquitur to prove the
defect:
To require plaintiff to prove negligence would impose in cases
like the instant one an impossible burden since here neither plaintiff
nor defendant was able to locate even the cause of the malfunction.
49 432 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
50 260 A.2d 111 (N.H. 1969).
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The plaintiff is entitled to proceed upon strict liability in tort in this
case if there is evidence from which a jury could find that the mal-
function of the lights caused the accident and arose from a defect
present at the time of purchase.5
On the other hand, some people believe that res ipsa loquitur is
not applicable on the basis of such cases as Shramek v. General Motors
Corporation.52 In this case an automobile had been purchased in Feb-
ruary of 1961 and an accident happened on October 20, 1961, ap-
proximately nine months after the purchase. An automobile tire had
blown out. The tire was not available for examination. Defendants
moved for summary judgment, which the court granted. However, it is
doubtful whether this case stands for the proposition that res ipsa
loquitur may not be employed, inasmuch as one of the reasons for the
decision was that the plaintiff appeared unable to prove that the accident
was the result of the tire. The court stated:
We hold that the entry of a summary judgment was both proper
and required in this case because the record conclusively demonstrates
that plaintiff will not be able to prove, directly or inferentially essential
elements of his case; i.e., (1) that the accident which resulted in his
injuries was caused by a tire . ..
Moreover, aside from a superficial inspection of the damaged car
and tire after the accident by plaintiff and his cousin, the tire in ques-
tion was never subjected to an examination which could reveal that
the blowout was due to a pre-existing defect. Thus, without any exam-
ination of the tire designed to elicit the cause of the blowout and with-
out the tire itself or any hope or expectation of its recovery, plaintiff
could never prove, directly or inferentially, a case of negligence, breach
of warranty or strict liability. .. . The mere fact of a tire blowout does
not demonstrate the manufacturer's negligence, nor tend to establish
that the tire was defective. Blowouts can be attributed to myriad causes,
including not only the care with which the tires are maintained, but the
conditions of the roads over which they are driven and the happen-
stance striking of damaging objects.5 3
In other words in the Shramek case, the accident could just as
easily have been caused by running over a piece of glass, a nail, a
jagged piece of iron or a hole in the street."
In an action for injury to the plaintiff when fingers of a steel sheet
piler, manufactured by one defendant and sold to plaintiff's employer
by another, opened when they should have remained closed, allowing
51 Id. at 113.
52 69 Ill. App. 2d 72, 216 N.E.2d 244 (1966).
53 Id. at 78; 216 N.E.2d at 24647.
54 Supra n.6 at 84 (further citations regarding causation).
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a steel sheet to fall, plaintiff sufficiently established the defective condi-
tion of the piler, for purposes of strict liability, by evidence of the
malfunction. Changes in the piler made by plaintiff's employer but not
affecting the nature of the machine did not affect defendant's liability.
The evidence sufficiently showed that the defect existed at the time of
delivery of the machine and did not show assumption of risk by the
plaintiff or intervening causative negligence by plaintiff's employer."
Defendant seller of Kraft Red Label type shortening was held
liable to purchaser for injury from an explosion where, on the evidence
presented, the only explanation for the explosion was a defect in the
product.5"
On the other hand, it was held that the requirement of showing a
defect cannot be satisfied by reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur."
10. Proper and Abnormal Use of a Product
While many of the cases state that the seller is not to be held liable
when the consumer makes abnormal use of the product, the recent case
law trend is to permit the jury to determine whether certain unintended
or abnormal uses should be anticipated as within the scope of foresee-
able risk.'
It has been held that manufacturers have a duty to provide ade-
quate warning extending beyond the scope of the intended use of the
product in reaching into the zone of foreseeable use.59
On occasion, defendants may disprove causation and/or any defect
existed by showing that misuse or any improper use rather than the
condition of the product itself was responsible for the plaintiff's injuries.
However, if the plaintiff has used the product in a manner reasonably
foreseeable, defendant will still be liable.'
In determining whether a product has been normally or abnormally
55 Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Penn. 1967).
56 Franks v. National Dairy Products Corp., 282 F. Supp. 528 (W.D. Tex. 1968).
57 McCurter v. Norton Co., 263 Cal. App. 2d 402, 69 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1968).
58 See e.g., Dunham v. Vaughan and Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401
(1969). Supra n.6 at 91.
59 Post v. American Cleaning Equipment Corp., 437 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
60 See Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 111. App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968).
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handled it is pertinent whether or not it was reasonably foreseeable that
the products would be handled or used in the manner described."'
It has been held that the second accident or second impact rule,
wherein the plaintiff has been injured by coming in contact with the
interior of his vehicle, falls within the concept of normal use.'
Where plaintiff used a grinding wheel at speeds in excess of the
rated capacity, there was no liability. 3 Where a plaintiff knew a par-
ticular jack should not be used on a particular make of car, there was
no liability."
Where the plaintiff had attempted to stabilize a ladder while using
it on an unstable surface, although the ladder was accompanied by
directions not to use it on such surface and where the plaintiff had made
changes in the ladder, no liability was established.65
11. Normal Wear and Tear
Generally manufacturers are not liable for injuries resulting from
the ordinary wear or deterioration of the product.6" A number of cases
hold the manufacturer or supplier liable many years after the fabrica-
tion of the product. In Thomas v. Ford Motor Co.,67 Ford Motor Com-
pany contended that the cause of the accident was wear and tear to a
wheel. Plaintiff had a retail tire man, of 21 years experience, place an
old lock ring from an old exploded wheel on a new wheel of the exact
same type and then place a new lock ring on an old wheel demonstrat-
ing to the jury that the age of the wheel had nothing to do with the
safety of the lock ring in question.
12. Contributory Negligence-Assumption of Risk
This is the most strenuously litigated area of defense in strict tort
liability cases. Although there is a considerable amount of confusion
in the opinions, it is becoming increasingly clear that contributory
negligence as it is understood in negligence law, is not applicable to
61 See Estabrook v. J. C. Penney Co., 10 Ariz. App. 114, 456 P.2d 960 (1969).
62 Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
63 McCurter v. Norton Co., 263 Cal. App. 2d 402, 69 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1968).
64 Brandenburg v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 27 Ill. App. 2d 374, 222 N.E.2d 348 (1966).
65 Erickson v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 793, 50 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1966).
60 See 1 L. Frumer and M. Friedman, supra n.4 at § 11.03 and Hursh, supra n.4 at
§ 2:4. See also Dunham v. Vaughan and Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d
684 (1967).
67 Birmingham, Ala., Cir. Ct. (1968). See, 11 A.T.L.N. 455 (1968).
14 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
strict tort liability cases. Since negligence is not the basis of the strict
tort liability case, contributory negligence should not be a defense.6"
Probably the better reasoned formulation of this defense appears
in the recent Illinois Supreme Court decision of Williams v. Brown
Manufacturing Company,6" in which it was held in addition to the fact
that a plaintiff who uses a product for a purpose neither intended nor
objectively reasonably foreseeable may be barred from recovery, that
the concept of contributory negligence is not applicable in strict product
liability in tort cases. The court held that "assumption of risk" is an
affirmative defense which does bar recovery. The test to be applied in
determining whether a user has assumed the risk of using a product
known to be dangerously defective is fundamentally a subjective test, in
the sense that it is the user's knowledge, understanding, and appreciation
of the danger which must be assessed, rather than that of the reason-
ably prudent man. In other words, a person who is aware of an un-
reasonably dangerous defect in a product and who proceeds to use the
product in spite of that knowledge, will be barred from recovery.
As a side light, it should be noted that the common law and the
Uniform Sales Act cases hold that implied warranties are excluded
where inspection or examination would have revealed the defect and
the buyer failed to inspect or adequately inspect. The Uniform Com-
mercial Code similarly excludes the implication of a warranty as to
defects which an examination ought to have revealed, but recognizes
that the standard of inspection is less stringent for non-commercial in-
dividual buyers than for commercial buyers. However, this is contrary
to strict tort liability wherein it is the subjective knowledge of the
plaintiff which controls and not what reasonable men might have done
under similar circumstances.
Also, under 402A of the Restatement, contributory negligence in
the sense of a failure to discover a defect in a product or to guard
against the possibility of its existence is not a defense. In comment n
to section 402A it is stated:
On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which con-
sists in a voluntary and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk,
is a defense under this section as in other cases of strict liability. If the
08 See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 111. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
69 45 11L 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
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user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and
nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is
injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
The foregoing seems to be consistent with Greenman, Vandermark
and Cintrone.7°
Numerous cases hold that the failure of the user of a product to
search for or guard against the possibility of a product defect is not a
defense. 7'
It has also been held that even though the plaintiff was present on
prior occasions when a machine malfunctioned, such can be no defense
unless it is shown that the plaintiff observed and understood the mal-
function and that the malfunction was the same as that which injured
the plaintiff.7"
13. Statutes of Limitation
It seems axiomatic that in strict tort liability cases the personal
injury statutes of limitations apply. The question then arises as to when
does the statute begin to run. Again in the recent Illinois Supreme Court
case of Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co.,7 3 the court held that the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff has been
injured.
In the case of Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works,74 it was held
that the four year limitation period of the Uniform Commercial Code
controls a breach of warranty action in which damages for personal
injuries are claimed. Apparently this is an area of possible conflict, not
only between strict liability in tort and the Uniform Commercial Code,
but between the Code and the pre-code warranty law. 5
As to the time of accrual, the pre-code warranty cases are in con-
flict. Some hold the action accrues at the time of sale even though the
injury or damage occurs later, while others hold that the action accrues
at the time the defect is or should have been discovered.
70 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d. 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963) ; Vander-
mark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 198 (1964) ; Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing,
45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
71 See, e.g., 0. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968).
72 Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969) noted at 12 A.T.L.N.
110 (1969).
73 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
74 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1965).
75 2 L. Frumer and M. Friedman, supra n.4 at § 16A [5] [g].
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In strict liability in tort, as stated above, the better reasoned rule
appears to be that the cause of action accrues at the time of accident or
injury.
Strict tort liability also applies to wrongful death cases."'
In death actions the warranty cases are in conflict as to whether
a death action predicated upon a breach of warranty is maintainable.
If manufacturing or supplying a defective product is considered a tort,
then the death action would be maintainable under the language of most
death statutes.
It has been held that warranty liability is a tort liability and that
the action was governed by a three year (tort) and not four year (UCC
warranty) statute of limitations.77 And in Wilsey v. Sam Mulkey Co.,7"
the court held that a personal injury complaint alleging strict tort liabil-
ity is a tort action governed by the three year statute and the action
accrues at the time of the accident. The court dismissed the count pre-
dicated on breach of warranty under New York rule that the warranty
action is governed by six year statute of limitations for contracts and
accrues at the time of sale-in this case in 1956-whereas the accident
occurred in 1963."9
14. Types of Injuries to Which Applicable
Although it may seem axiomatic, it is possible defendants may
attempt to raise defenses on the basis that the doctrine does not apply
to particular types of injuries. Obviously the theory is applicable to
personal injuries. Courts have held the doctrine applicable in wrongful
death actions.' The cause of action applies to property damage."'
There is some authority for the position that the theory may serve
as a basis for recovery of damages, reducing the value of the very
product itself.8 2
78 Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44 (1965) ; Swain v. Boeing Airplane
Co., 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1964). See Harsh, supra n.4 at § 5A:14.
77 Abate v. Barkers Inc., 27 Conn. Sup. 46, 229 A.2d 266 (1967).
78 56 Misc. 2d 480, 289 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1968).
79 Contra Mendellve Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 57 Misc. 2d 45, 291 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1967).
s0 Hursh, supra n.4 at 256.
8' See Hursh, supra n.4 at § 5A:15; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965);
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 198 (1964); Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 32 III. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
82 See Santor v. A. and M. Karagheusian Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1964), and
Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966).
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Although it has been recognized that a plaintiff may recover on
this theory for monetary losses, such as medical payments or loss of
earnings, and that he may likewise recover for the cost of repairing
damaged property or a reduction in value of the product directly atV
tributable to its defective condition, the courts apparently have refused
to extend strict liability doctrine to cases involving consequential com-
mercial losses in the absence of personal injuries. For example, in
Sweely v. White Motor Co.,' the trial court awarded plaintiff damages
for the amount of payments on the purchase price of a truck for lost
profits. It was held that although such an award could properly be sus-
tained on the basis of breach of warranty, it could not be sustained on
the theory of strict liability in tort. The truck had overturned and was
damaged, without the plaintiff himself having been personally injured.
The court held defendant could not be liable on the basis of strict
liability in tort for plaintiff's commercial losses in connection with the
payments on the purchase price and his lost profits.
It has been held that the doctrine is not applicable in an action
by a cosmetic manufacturer against the manufacturer of aerosol cans
in which the plaintiff claimed that, as a result of leakage of the cosmetic
from the can, customers stopped purchasing plaintiff's product. Plain-
tiff was forced to refund substantial sums to customers, and plaintiff's
name and good will were damaged. 4
15. Persons Entitled to Benefit from the Strict Liability Doctrine
The doctrine applies to the purchaser.
The doctrine applies to the user or consumer.8 5
The doctrine applies to a bystander.8 "
16. Unavoidably Unsafe Products
Comment k following section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d
suggests that there may be certain unavoidably unsafe products for
which strict liability in tort should not be imposed. Quoting an example
from the field of drugs, the section suggests that Pasteur treatment of
rabies, which not uncommonly leads to various serious and damaging
83 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
84 Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 72 Il. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726
(1966).
85 See Hursh, supra n.4 at § 5A:19.
86 Id. at § 5A: 20; Elore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451
P.2d 84 (1969).
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consequences, should be considered unavoidably unsafe. Since the
disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing
and use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoid-
able high degree of risk which they involve. However, it should be made
clear that the danger is the result of allergies peculiar in the individual
himself and not from an adulteration of the drug. In other words, the
drug is absolutely pure and the side effects result from allergic reactions
within the individual himself. This is to be distinguished from such
items as contaminated blood, in which the blood itself is contaminated
and diseased and ill effects result from such contamination and disease
which is improperly within the blood. 7
The Restatement mentions that, because of lack of time and oppor-
tunity for sufficient medical experience, many new or experimental drugs
have no assurance of safety or of purity of ingredients. Nonetheless,
the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recog-
nizable risk may be justified. The seller of such products, again with
the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held
to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use.
In spite of the Restatement, a California court has held that a
manufacturer of a drug sold pursuant to a physician's prescription may
be held strictly liable in tort."
In Yarrow v. Sterling Drug Co.," aralen was given to the plaintiff
as a treatment for an arthritic condition. The drug was known by the
manufacturer to have certain complications and plaintiff's doctor re-
ceived a letter to that effect. As the result of daily administration of the
drug, plaintiff became 80% blind. Although the court found that the
product was not defective, liability was imposed for the defendant's
failure to adequately warn plaintiff's doctor of the damage through its
salesman. The court further held that the intervening conduct of the
doctor did not insulate the manufacturer. In Davis v. Wyeth Labora-
tories, Inc.," there was a failure to warn of risk from Sabin Oral Polio
Vaccine, even though the risk was to only one person per million. 1
87 See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
88 Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
89 263 F. Supp. 159 (D.S.D. 1967), aff'd 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969).
90 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
91 Supra, n.6 at 86.
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CONCLUSION
Because decisions are constantly being rendered, any discussion of
strict liability in tort is destined to be outdated even as it goes to press.
Also, as previously mentioned, no law review article on this topic can
be exhaustive. Our purpose herein has been the practical one-to alert
you to possible defenses and the manner in which they have been dealt
with in the case law.
